Punitive Damages Revisited: A Statistical Analysis of How Federal Circuit Courts Decide the Constitutionality of Such Awards by Momioka, Hironari
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
6-1-2017
Punitive Damages Revisited: A Statistical Analysis
of How Federal Circuit Courts Decide the
Constitutionality of Such Awards
Hironari Momioka
Hokkaido University of Education
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Supreme Court of the
United States Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hironari Momioka, Punitive Damages Revisited: A Statistical Analysis of How Federal Circuit Courts Decide the Constitutionality of Such





PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVISITED: A STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF HOW FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS 
DECIDE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUCH 
AWARDS 
HIRONARI MOMIOKA 
“It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with 
it fathom all the depths of the ocean.” 
-John Locke 
ABSTRACT 
Using data from punitive damages decisions of U.S. federal circuit courts from 
2004 to 2012, this paper attempts to establish empirically the following: (1) there is 
no apparent statistical difference between the levels of jury and judge awards; (2) 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Philip Morris (2007) or Exxon (2008) do not 
actually or substantially affect the level of punitive damage awards; (3) with regard 
to the cases involving remittitur, or reduction of awards, the Exxon decision did not 
radically affect the decreasing ratio of punitive to compensatory damage awards; (4) 
as the levels of compensatory awards go up, the ratio becomes strikingly low and 
stable; (5) finally, the proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards is 
not the key factor that influences upper court judges when they consider the 
constitutionality of punitive damages. Unexplained portions of the relationship 
between the amount of punitive damages and the wealth of a defendant remain to be 
examined further. 
CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 380 
II.  CASES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A SUMMARY ......................................... 384 
A. The Pre-BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore Period: Punitive 
Damage Awards Not Constitutionally Limited .............................. 385 
B. BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) and its Aftermath: Punitive 
Damages Awards Constitutionally Limited ................................... 386 
C. State Farm (2003): Single Digit Rule ............................................. 387 
D. Philip Morris (2007): Procedural Due Process ............................. 388 
E. Exxon (2008): One to One Ratio Rule ........................................... 389 
F.  This Article’s Contribution to an Understanding of Punitive Damages 
Awards ........................................................................................... 390 
III.   DATA AND MAIN RESULTS ..................................................................... 391 
A. The Data Used in This Study ......................................................... 391 
B. The Punitive to Compensatory Damages Ratio ............................. 391 
C. Judge-Jury Differences .................................................................. 392 
D. Case Category, Case Types, Party Status, and Locale .................. 394 
1. Case Category ....................................................................... 397 
                                                          
  Professor, Asahikawa Campus, Hokkaido University of Education, Japan. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
380 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:379 
 
2. Litigant Type ......................................................................... 397 
E. The Supreme Court Decisions and Circuit Court Judges .............. 398 
1. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Year ........................ 398 
2. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Period ..................... 399 
3. Reduced Damages (Remittitur) ............................................. 401 
F. Stratifying the Punitive to Compensatory Ratio ............................ 403 
G. Federal Circuit Court and Punitive Damages ............................... 405 
1. Federal Circuit Court Judges’ Decisions to Affirm or Deny 
Awarded Punitive Damages .................................................. 405 
2.  Logistic Regression Models of Whether or Not Awarded 
Punitive Damages Were Affirmed ........................................ 406 
IV.   DISCUSSION ............................................................................................ 407 
A.  Key Findings .................................................................................. 407 
B.  Implications of This Study ............................................................. 408 
C.  Limits of the Present Study ............................................................ 409 
V.   CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 409 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages have become an increasingly controversial subject, in both 
scholarly and legislative debate, over the past three decades in the United States. One 
of the reasons why punitive damages are hotly debated in U.S. tort reform debates is 
that punitive damages award amounts can be quite large—even astronomical. One 
illustration is the Supreme Court’s 2007 Philip Morris USA v. Williams decision.1 In 
this case, a jury in Oregon awarded the plaintiff (the widow of a heavy smoker) 
$79.5 million in punitive damages at trial.2 In that regard, civil jury trials and 
punitive damages in general are, more often than not, a target of audible public 
criticism, inter alia from tort reformers.  
By no means are debates regarding punitive damage awards limited to the United 
States. Punitive damage awards are also a source of tension in international civil 
justice relations. For example, the Supreme Court of Japan dealt with a civil case in 
1997 where one of the legal issues was whether punitive damages, awarded by a 
California court, could be compulsorily required through civil procedure in Japan.3 
The Court refused to order the defendant to pay punitive damages on the grounds 
that such awards went against public policy in Japan.4 One might say, however, that 
the raison d’être of—or public policy reasons behind—punitive damage awards 
seem underappreciated by the Japanese Court.  
In Japanese legal academic circles, much lengthy attention has been paid to the 
punitive awards system from the viewpoint of punishing or deterring defendants’ 
                                                          
 1  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 2  Id. at 350. 
 3  For a full account of this case, see Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and 
Enforcement of Common Law Punitive Damages in a Civil Law System: Some Reflections on 
the Japanese Experience, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 285, 288-99 (1999). 
 4  See John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the 
Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 514, 518, 528 (2007) (stating refusals to 
enforce judgments by Japanese, Italian, and German courts).  
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wrongdoing via civil lawsuits.5 That is partly because Japan’s legal system has 
neither punitive damages nor jury trials in the civil system and partly because the 
public law system, which includes criminal and administrative proceedings, does not 
necessarily function so effectively as to punish or deter a huge corporation’s 
wrongdoings.6 In sum, punitive damages awards are alien to the Japanese legal 
system, but the heated controversy over such awards is nonetheless of great interest 
to a host of jurists in Japan.7  
In order to cope with these issues, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
attempted to stop or prevent punitive awards from “running wild” or “skyrocketing” 
by suggesting that the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution limit the 
punitive damages regime.8 Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: (1) 
punitive damages could violate the substantive due process of law if they are 
“grossly excessive” in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,9 (2) a single digit 
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio is more likely to comport with due process 
in State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Campbell,10 (3) the jury shall not take into consideration 
the harm that the misconduct caused others when calculating the punitive damages in 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams,11 and (4) under maritime law, the ratio shall not 
exceed one in Exxon Shipping v. Baker.12  
In parallel with the U.S. Supreme Court’s intense attempts to prevent punitive 
awards from “skyrocketing,” quite a few states have passed legislation imposing 
various limits on punitive awards over the course of the last two decades. There are 
several types of statutory regulations:13 absolute monetary caps,14 maximum ratio of 
punitive to compensatory awards,15 and a combination of the two.16 In addition, there 
                                                          
 5  Saisiri Siriviriyakul, The Imposition of Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis 50 
(2012) (on file with the Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign). 
 6  Jeffrey Hays, Legal System in Japan—History, Judges, Lawyers, Long Trials, 
Convictions, FACTS & DETAILS (Jan. 2013), 
http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat22/sub147/item807.html. 
 7  See, e.g., Hisashi Aizawa et al., Recent Developments in Punitive Damages Laws, 72 
COMP. L. J. 110, 110-35, 216-18 (2011) (summary in English). 
 8  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). 
 9  BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996). For more details, see infra 
Section II.B and accompanying text.  
 10  State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). For more details, 
see infra Section II.C and accompanying text.  
 11  Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007). For more details, see infra 
Section II.D and accompanying text.  
 12  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008). For more details, see infra 
Section II.E and accompanying text.  
 13  See generally JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW 
AND PRACTICE 487-525 (2d ed. 2012). 
 14  The Virginia statute, for example, limits the total amount of punitive damages to 
$350,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2016). Similarly, the Georgia statute limits the amount 
of such damages to $250,000. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2016). 
 15  The State of Colorado has limited the amount of punitive damages to the amount of 
actual damages. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(2) (2016).  
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are several other ways that courts have exercised greater judicial control over 
punitive awards, including lifting the burden of proof,17 ordering payment to a state 
fund,18 requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s wealth,19 bifurcation of trials,20 
and judicial determination of the punitive damage amount.21  
On the other hand, the underlying debate over the unpredictability of punitive 
awards still simmers in legal academic circles. A considerable number of statistical 
studies have been conducted on the punitive damages system.22 Through those 
                                                                                                                                         
 16  A number of states have adopted this type of restriction. Florida, for example, has 
limited any punitive damage recovery to three times the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded or $500,000, whichever is greater. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (2016). Likewise, in 
South Carolina, three times, $500,000, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-530(A) (2016); Tennessee, 
two times, $500,000, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(5) (2016); and Arkansas, three times, 
$250,000, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208(a)(1) (2016). Another version of a limitation includes 
the wealth of the defendant: a Montana statute provides that an award for punitive damages 
may not exceed $10 million or 3% of a defendant’s net worth, whichever is less. MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2015). 
 17  To date, Colorado is the only jurisdiction that has lifted the burden of proof to “beyond 
a reasonable doubt,” instead of “clear and convincing proof” or “preponderance of evidence.” 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2016). 
 18  Several states have enacted legislation authorizing distribution of some portion of the 
punitive damages to a state or public entity. In Georgia, for example, 75% of any amounts 
awarded as punitive or exemplary damages must be paid into the treasury of the state. GA. 
CODE. ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2016); see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 542 
(1993). 
 19  Several jurisdictions have limited the introduction of evidence regarding the 
defendant’s wealth when a claim for punitive damages is made, so that the fact finder can 
concentrate on the defendant’s conduct rather than on her or his “wealth.” Florida, for 
example, allows no discovery of the defendant’s financial worth “unless there is a reasonable 
showing . . . for recovery of [punitive] damages.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (2016). These 
changes represent legislative attempts to minimize the prejudicial effects of otherwise relevant 
evidence in punitive damages litigation.  
 20  Several jurisdictions provide by statute that the trial must be bifurcated to separate 
punitive damage claim from the underlying liability issues including compensatory damages. 
For example, Georgia, Montana, and Nevada require bifurcation in all punitive damage cases. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (2015); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 42.005(3) (2015). 
 21  A few states, including Kansas, have enacted legislation requiring the court, rather than 
the jury, to determine the amount of any punitive damage award. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3701(a) (2016).  
 22  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive 
Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 
(2011) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., 
The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. L. ANAL. 577 (2010) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in 
Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages]; 
Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of Jury 
Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
855 (2010); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/7
2017] PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVISITED 383 
 
empirical studies, including those conducted by Cornell Law Professor Theodore 
Eisenberg, there is a recognition that punitive damages are rarely awarded and the 
amount assessed by the jury is lower than originally imagined.23 Conversely, some 
critics, including Harvard Law Professor W. Kip Viscusi, argue that punitive awards 
resulting from jury trials are unpredictable and that “juries are especially likely to 
make a large punitive damages award” in comparison to judges.24  
There have been, however, no full-fledged empirical or statistical studies that 
examine the relationship between the Supreme Court’s position on the 
constitutionality of punitive damages and the behavior of lower courts involving 
punitive awards claims. In other words, notwithstanding its extreme importance, 
very few attempts have been made to explain how the Supreme Court decisions have 
influenced the lower courts within the scheme of punitive damages.25  
This raises an interesting underlying question: Does the punitive damages award 
regime operate to punish or deter wrongful acts, or does the award serve the 
American public in some other way? How and to what extent punitive damages 
function in American society is of great interest. According to Justice Holmes, the 
law does not exist in a vacuum, but responds to “felt needs of society”26 Law and the 
system that enforces it, such as the civil jury procedure, case law, and so on, have 
close relations to the society to which they belong. Ubi societas, ibi ius, as the 
Roman legal maxim goes.27 It is undoubtedly a crux of the debate over the punitive 
damages system.  
At the same time, it is extremely hard and almost impossible to prove or find 
evidence of the link between laws. Therefore, as a preliminary and exploratory 
study, this article will explore the connection between the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions mentioned above and lower courts decisions, with respect to punitive 
damages awarded.  
Specifically, this article examines the impact of major U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions regarding punitive damages, such as Philip Morris and Exxon, on lower 
courts. This article gathers and analyzes data spanning eight years (2004-2012) from 
federal circuit court decisions. Considering this new data set will augment analysis 
contained in previous studies by providing more detailed and nuanced insight. 
                                                                                                                                         
Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. 
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 175 (2006). 
 23  See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study, supra note 22, at 578-89. 
 24  See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries 
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 36 (2004) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Perform]; see also 
W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 
342 (2001) (stating that jurors informed with a detailed rationale and mathematical formula 
for setting punitive damages would not perform well). 
 25  See Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified 
Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523 (2010). 
 26  Michael C. Lasky, Recent Developments in Employment Law, FINDLAW, 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/recent-developments-in-employment-law.html 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 27  Frank J. Garcia, Between Cosmopolis and Community: The Emerging Basis for Global 
Justice, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1 n.1 (2013). The Roman legal maxim translates to, 
“Where there is society, there are laws.” Id. 
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Furthermore, this article attempts to examine both whether the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages significantly differs across different levels of compensatory 
damages and what kind of factors appellate judges consider most frequently when 
deciding the validity or adequacy of punitive awards, from the perspective of 
substantive due process. This study utilizes a statistical approach.28  
Section II begins with an examination of U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing 
with the issue of punitive damages. Section III elaborates on the descriptive results 
of the analysis, using several statistical techniques. Section IV discusses the results, 
and Section V provides a conclusion.  
II. CASES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A SUMMARY 
The punitive damages system is well established in American tort law. For more 
than two decades, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has amended the punitive 
damages regime in quite a few decisions, resulting in important constitutional 
restrictions on such awards. These decisions include: Browning-Ferris Industries of 
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,29 Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip,30 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,31 BMW of North 
America Inc. v. Gore,32 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,33 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams,34 and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.35  
                                                          
 28  Adopting this kind of “statistical” or “empirical” approach to a legal phenomenon is 
less common, prevalent, or widely used in America, even less so in Japan. However, an 
empirical approach is essential and valuable because every single legal doctrine shall be based 
upon a precise grasp of status quo. I firmly believe so precisely because I have obtained 
corroborative evidence that data results correctly gathered and analyzed are of great use and 
importance because of my previous work concerning an attitudinal survey on indigenous 
people’s civil rights in Hokkaido, Japan. See Hironari Momioka, Taking Minority Rights 
Seriously: A Statistical Analysis of the Attitude Survey of Ainu Culture Law, part 2, 58 (2) J. 
HOKKAIDO U. EDUC. 17 (2008); Hironari Momioka, Civil Rights and the Courts: A Statistical 
Analysis of the Attitude Survey of The Nibutani Dam Decision and Ainu Culture Law, 113 (5 
& 6) CHUO L. REV. 33 (2007). Furthermore, in the future, I will extend the methodology 
employed in this project to examining areas such as judicial review, freedom of the press, and 
equal protection of the law. Specifically, I expect that logistic regression models can be 
applied to an analysis of judicial review.  
 29  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 
(1989). 
 30  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 4 (1991). 
 31  TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993). 
 32  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1996). 
 33  State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003). 
 34  Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007). 
 35  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 475-76 (2008). There are other Supreme 
Court decisions, such as Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 
(2001) (observing that de novo standard, instead of abuse of discretion standard, is required 
when the federal appeal courts examine punitive awards); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 
U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (stating that a state constitutional provision limiting judicial review of 
the size of punitive damage awards was in violation of the Due Process of the federal 
Constitution). 
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A. The Pre-BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore Period: Punitive Damage Awards 
Not Constitutionally Limited 
In Browning-Ferris, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a large punitive 
damages award violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “excessive fines.”36 
In this case, the defendant attempted to pressure the plaintiff to leave a local disposal 
business by engaging in illegal price-fixing and interference with contracts.37 The 
jury awarded the plaintiff $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in 
punitive damages.38 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to 
limit punitive damages in this case because the plaintiff was a non-governmental 
party.39  
In the Haslip case, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to punitive damages.40 The Court approved the punitive damage 
award granted at trial, which was more than four times the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded.41 The Court commented that “unlimited jury discretion . . . in the 
fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional 
sensibilities.”42 Because the actual jury instructions at issue, however, ensured that 
the jury’s discretion was “exercised within reasonable constraints,”43 the punitive 
awards did not violate the due process of the law.44  
Haslip also contains reference to the goals of punitive damages.45 With respect to 
the specific jury instructions at issue, the Court explained that the very purpose of 
such awards is not to compensate, but to punish the wrongdoers and “protect the 
public by [deterring] the defendant and others”46 from engaging in similar harmful 
acts in the future. According to the instructions given in Haslip, the Court called 
upon the jury to take into consideration “the character and the degree of the wrong as 
shown by the evidence and the necessity of preventing similar wrong.”47 The Court 
concluded that the states’ appellate review of such awards also limited the jury’s 
discretion.48  
                                                          
 36  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 
(1989). 
 37  Id. at 261.  
 38  Id. at 262.  
 39  Id. at 263-64.  
 40  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12 (1991). 
 41  Id. at 23-24.  
 42  Id. at 18.  
 43  Id. at 20.  
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. at 19. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id.  
 48  Id. at 21. In Haslip, Justice O’Connor was the sole dissenter. Depicting the punitive 
damages system as a “powerful weapon,” she contended that there had been an explosion in 
the frequency and size of punitive damages and that juries were not constrained in their 
discretion. Id. at 61-63 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court again upheld a punitive damages award in 
TXO.49 In that case, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was 
remarkably 526 times larger than the compensatory damages awarded.50 The main 
issue the Court considered was whether the ratio violated the Due Process Clause.51 
In support of its claim for punitive damages at trial, the plaintiff presented evidence 
that the defendant had “engaged in similar nefarious activities in its business 
dealings in other parts of the country.”52  
Relying on Haslip, the Court declined to draw mathematical bright lines and 
went on to note that “it is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm 
that the defendant’s conduct would have caused its intended victim . . . as well as the 
possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior 
were not deterred.”53 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the punitive damage 
award was not excessive in light of due process because of the large amount of 
money at stake, the defendant’s bad faith, a larger pattern of fraud and deceit, and 
the defendant’s wealth.54 Thus, the Court’s finding was that no due process violation 
occurred in TXO55 or in Haslip.56  
B. BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) and its Aftermath: Punitive Damages 
Awards Constitutionally Limited 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated, for the first time, in its landmark decision of 
BMW57, that excessive punitive awards could violate the Due Process Clause.58 In 
BMW, the defendant, a national dealership, failed to disclose that the brand new car 
it sold to the plaintiff had been repainted before delivery.59 At trial, the actual 
damages were only $4,000, but the jury in Alabama awarded $4 million in punitive 
damages (later reduced on appeal to $2 million).60  
 The issue the Court considered in BMW was whether the punitive damages award 
violated the Due Process Clause.61 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the 
Court and set forth a legal standard composed of three guideposts to test whether or 
not a punitive damage award is “grossly excessive” and too arbitrary to be 
                                                          
 49  TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1993). 
 50  Id. at 453. 
 51  Id. at 446. 
 52  Id. at 450-51. 
 53  Id. at 460. 
 54  Id. at 462. 
 55  Id. at 453. 
 56  Id. at 459. 
 57  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996). 
 58  Id. at 562. 
 59  Id. at 563-64.  
 60  Id. at 565.  
 61  Id. at 562. 
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constitutional.62 The guideposts were based on the notion that the defendant should 
“receive . . . fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, 
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”63 The first and “most 
important” guidepost is whether the damages are commensurate to the level of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.64 The second is whether a reasonable 
relationship exists between the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages.65 
However, the Court refused to define what ratio constitutes “reasonable 
relationship.”66 The last guidepost is a comparison of the punitive damage award to 
the civil or criminal penalties imposed for equivalent conduct.67 The Court also held 
that punitive damages cannot punish a defendant for conduct committed in another 
state.68 Applying these three factors to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that 
the punitive damage award in this case was unconstitutionally excessive.69  
 In BMW, the votes were split.70 Justices Ginsburg and Rehnquist dissented on the 
grounds that states permitting punitive damages have an interest in punishment and 
deterrence and that the Court unwisely infringed on the realm of state law because 
the procedure fully satisfied due process.71 Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on 
the substantive due process review and denounced the three guideposts as “a road to 
nowhere.”72  
C. State Farm (2003): Single Digit Rule 
In the next case, State Farm, the Court further strengthened the constraints on 
punitive damages.73 In a case for insurance bad faith arising out of the insurer’s 
failure to settle a third-party liability claim, the jury awarded compensatory damages 
of $1 million and punitive damages of $145 million.74 Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the Court, slightly clarified the Court’s second guidepost in BMW and stated that 
“single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process.”75 Based 
largely upon the fact that the ratio was 145, the Court concluded that the punitive 
damages award in State Farm was constitutionally infirm.76  
                                                          
 62  Id. at 574-75.  
 63  Id. at 574.  
 64  Id. at 575.  
 65  Id. at 580.  
 66  Id. at 582. 
 67  Id. at 583.  
 68  Id. at 572.  
 69  Id. at 585-86.  
 70  Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 606 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 71  Id. at 607.  
 72  Id. at 605.  
 73  State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003). 
 74  Id. at 415.  
 75  Id. at 425.  
 76  Id. at 429.  
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The Court, however, acknowledged that a higher multiple may be 
constitutionally permissible depending upon the amount of compensatory damages.77 
Specifically, the Court stated, “The precise award in any case, of course, must be 
based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to 
the plaintiff.”78  
In State Farm, the Court also stated that punitive damages cannot punish a 
defendant for “dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was 
premised.”79 It went on to hold that due process “does not permit courts, in the 
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ 
hypothetical claims against a defendant.”80 This principle turned out to be a 
foreshadowing of the main holding in Philip Morris, discussed below.81  
D. Philip Morris (2007): Procedural Due Process 
In 2007, three years after State Farm, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Philip Morris clarified the reprehensibility guidepost.82 This case involved an award 
of some $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages 
from litigation regarding the death of a heavy smoker in Oregon.83 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant cigarette manufacturer knowingly and falsely led him to 
believe that smoking was safe.84 The corporate defendant, Philip Morris, mainly 
argued that a portion of the $79.5 million punitive damages award “represented 
punishment for its having harmed others.”85  
 The Court chose not to consider whether this award was grossly excessive.86 
Instead, it focused on whether punitive damages can be based in part upon a jury’s 
desire to punish the defendant for harming nonparty victims.87 The Court held that 
such awards cannot punish the defendant for causing harm to individuals who are not 
parties to the lawsuit and have their own tort claims against the defendant.88 
Punishing the defendant for harm to nonparties violates the Due Process Clause for 
two reasons. First, such punishment deprives the defendant of an opportunity to 
defend itself against claims of injured nonparties.89 Second, punishment for harm to 
nonparties would “add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages 
                                                          
 77  Id. at 425. 
 78  Id.  
 79  Id. at 422-23.  
 80  Id. at 423.  
 81  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007). 
 82  Id. at 357. 
 83  Id. at 349-50.  
 84  Id.  
 85  Id. at 351.  
 86  Id. at 353.  
 87  Id. at 354. 
 88  Id.  
 89  Id. at 353-54.  
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/7
2017] PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVISITED 389 
 
equation,”90 if the calculation is based upon the amount of harmed nonparties, the 
extent of their injuries, and the circumstances of those injuries.91  
 Despite the above mentioned holding, the Court also noted that the jury may 
consider the defendant’s conduct towards nonparties in determining reprehensibility, 
as “harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.”92 In a nutshell, the main 
result of Philip Morris is that trial courts must provide “some form of protection” to 
ensure that the jury considers the evidence of harm to people other than the plaintiff 
when evaluating the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, but the jury should 
not consider this information when assessing the amount of punitive damages that 
might be awarded.93  
E. Exxon (2008): One to One Ratio Rule 
In the Exxon decision,94 the U.S. Supreme Court finally settled the disputes over 
the unprecedented environmental disaster in 1989 involving the Exxon Valdez and at 
the same time addressed a challenge to the punitive damages award by establishing 
the “one to one ratio rule.”95 The corporate defendant, Exxon Shipping Co., was 
allegedly reckless in allowing a known alcoholic to captain a tanker carrying crude 
oil. The captain caused one of the greatest accidents ever, spilling eleven million 
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.96 In the specific mandatory class 
action mainly brought by commercial fishermen for lost profits, the jury awarded 
$287 million in compensatory damages and $5 billion (later reduced to $2.5 billion) 
in punitive damages against the defendant.97  
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, began his discussion of the punitive 
damages award by holding that the case “goes to our understanding of the place of 
punishment in modern civil law and reasonable standards of process in administering 
punitive law.”98 After reviewing the history of punitive damages, the Court declared, 
“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”99 It 
                                                          
 90  Id. at 354.  
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. at 355.  
 93  Id. at 357. In most cases, however, it is evidently hard for a jury to make this 
distinction. For example, Justice Stevens points out the problem with regard to the difference 
between reprehensibility and punishing for harm caused to nonparties: “When a jury increases 
a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition punishing the defendant . . . for third party 
harm.” Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 94  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008). 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. at 478-79.  
 97  Id. at 480-81.  
 98  Id. at 490.  
 99  Id. at 499.  
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illustrated two cases with “strikingly similar facts,”100 where one jury awarded the 
plaintiff $4 million in punitive damages and the other awarded the plaintiff none.101  
The Court expressed skepticism that verbal formulations could work to promote 
“systematic consistency.”102 To better achieve predictability, it suggested that the 
fact finder “peg punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum 
multiple.”103 The amount of the multiplier should be based on the level of 
“blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum”104 and the amount of 
compensatory damages.105 If the amount is substantial, a lesser ratio is appropriate. If 
the amount is modest or the odds of detecting the harm are minimal, a higher ratio is 
appropriate.106 Heavily relying upon empirical scholarly studies, including Professor 
Eisenberg’s thesis,107 the Court determined that a one-to-one ratio was appropriate in 
the Exxon case due to mere recklessness of the conduct and the substantial 
compensatory award.108  
 As Exxon was decided under the principles of maritime law, its scope seems to 
be limited. Furthermore, because it was a common law-based challenge, its 
expressed concern for predictability is not binding on the states, and Congress could 
potentially abrogate the holding with legislation. Some lower courts, however, have 
already begun to incorporate Exxon’s concern for predictability within the 
constitutional analysis of punitive damages.109  
F. This Article’s Contribution to an Understanding of Punitive Damages Awards 
While most of the prior empirical literature, which mainly deals with state trial 
court decisions, is helpful for understanding the realities of punitive damages at the 
state or trial level, the more illuminating questions involve the decisions of federal 
appellate courts. This article, specifically exploring the impact of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions on federal circuit courts, provides a new perspective on how 
judges see the punitive damages regime within the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
framework. This is because circuit court judges are more likely than trial judges to 
hew to the Supreme Court’s holdings.  
This study also empirically clarifies the differences in impact of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions on lower courts. Conventional or traditional legal studies 
tend to look into the texts of the Court’s decisions and the backgrounds of those 
cases. Our data, on the other hand, attempts to explore whether or not the U.S. 
                                                          
 100  Id. at 500.  
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 504.  
 103  Id. at 506.  
 104  Id. at 512-13.  
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at 513.  
 107  Id. at 497; see also Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study, supra note 22.  
 108  Exxon, 554 U.S. at 513.  
 109  See, e.g., James Crystal Licenses, LLC v. Infinity Radio Inc., 43 So.3d 68, 79 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that a case where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
equals fifty-five could hardly be reasonably predictable). 
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Supreme Court doctrine functions as a proxy for shifts in appellate court behavior, as 
demonstrated by empirical evidence. Hence, our findings may provide a more 
multidimensional perspective on the Court’s holdings.  
III. DATA AND MAIN RESULTS 
A. The Data Used in This Study 
The data for this study, covering the last eight years (from November 1, 2004, to 
October 31, 2012), comes from the Lexis-Nexis Academic database. After a cursory 
reading of 1,115 federal circuit court cases, gathered by the key words “punitive 
damages” as legal terms, 318 (28.5%) of those cases were ones in which punitive 
damage awards had been granted (most of which were by federal district courts).110 
The remaining 797 (71.5%) cases were ones in which the plaintiffs did not prevail, 
were awarded compensatory damages only, or ones which have little relevance to 
this study, despite judicial reference to punitive damages in written decisions.111  
B. The Punitive to Compensatory Damages Ratio 
Table 1 shows the median and mean of punitive and compensatory awards 
granted in cases with punitive damages awards, as well as the punitive to 
compensatory damages ratio. Because there are fifteen cases where the adjudicators 
(jury or judge) awarded $0 in compensatory damages, the number of the ratio is 303.  
The difference between mean and median is glaring and striking, especially with 
regard to punitive damages awarded. The amount of the mean punitive damages is 
$493,195,929,112 while the amount of median is $500,000,113 which seems mediocre. 
The same holds true for the punitive to compensatory damages ratio. The reason why 
the mean punitive damages award or ratio is extremely high is simple: several 
outliers, such as the $5 billion punitive award in In re Exxon Valdez,114 tend to inflate 
the mean. When focusing solely on the mean award amount, it might safely be said 
that punitive damages are unpredictable and continue to “run wild,” as a number of 
tort reformers assert.  
However, what is important when gauging punitive awards is not mean, but 
rather median, because the latter outweighs the former in that it could exclude the 
impact of outliers.  
Now, let us examine the median punitive to compensatory damages ratio. 
Although the median 2.11 seems relatively higher than 0.62115 or 0.67116 in the prior 
literatures, it is not considerably high, given that all the cases in this study are from 
                                                          
 110  Hironari Momioka, Data Set Composed of 318 Cases to Assess Punitive Damages (on 
file with the author) [hereinafter Momioka, Data Set]. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
 114  In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1066 (D. Alaska 2002). 
 115  Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 331 Tbl.1. 
 116  Neil Vidmar & M.R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Theory and in 
Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 492-94 (2001). The authors point out, however, that there 
is substantial variability across case types. See id. 
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federal circuit courts. At that level of court, it is understandable that in almost all the 
cases the punitive damages amounts awarded were fairly large for the defendants. In 
that respect, we can say that the median ratio calculated in our study does not 
contradict, but instead supports, precedent studies.  
 
Table 1: Median and Mean Punitive and Compensatory Awards, 2004-2012 
 Median Mean N 
Punitive Award 500,00 493,195,929 318 
Compensatory 
Award 




2.11 8775.16 303 
Note: The data covers the time from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012. 
When calculating the ratio, 15 cases have been excluded where the plaintiff won 
a zero compensatory award (ratio incalculable) 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
C. Judge-Jury Differences 
We next compare jury awards with awards ordered by judges sitting alone, 
focusing on the ratio of punitive to compensatory awards. A ratio is, as discussed in 
Section II, described by quite a few scholars and in the Supreme Court decisions as 
an important “barometer of whether a punitive damages award is out of line.”117 
Table 2 reports by adjudicator, the medians, the means, their significances of 
difference, and the numbers of observations.  
The Table’s last column shows the observations. Litigants chose jury trials at an 
overwhelmingly higher rate than trial by judge alone. The rate at which litigants (a 
plaintiff, a defendant, or both) chose jury trials was 83.82%, though fifteen cases in 
which the compensatory awards were zero have been excluded for ease of 
calculation.118 The result demonstrates that litigants’ preference for jury trials in 
federal courts is almost the same as in the state courts. At the state court level, the 
rate at which litigants chose jury trials was 81.26%, in cases where both punitive and 
compensatory damages were awarded.119  
The third column indicates medians. The judge-jury difference between 1.37 and 
2.43 seems outstanding but is not statistically significant (a significant level is 5%), 
as shown in the fourth column.120 It is only in punitive damages awards that 
adjudicator difference shows a high statistical significance. According to the fifth 
and sixth columns, all means, including punitive to compensatory ratio, indicate no 
statistical difference. Thus, one could conclude that there seems to be no difference 
in assessing damages, as between jury and judge, as far as the cases before the 
                                                          
 117  Hersch & Viscusi, Perform, supra note 24, at 8-9. 
 118  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.2. 
 119  438 jury trials and 101 bench trials, according to the data from Civil Justice Survey of 
State Courts 1992-2001. See Theordore Eisenberg et al., Judges, Juries, and Punitive 
Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 
2001 Data, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 269 Tbl.1 (2006). 
 120  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.2. 
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federal appellate courts are concerned. It is also noteworthy that both the median 
ratios are far below the standard held in State Farm (“single digit”—that is, less than 
10 times).121  
 
Table 2: Median and Mean Punitive and Compensatory Awards, by Adjudicator 









































 Judge 1.37 61.41 49 
Note: **p<0.01. The significance mean difference is based upon a Mann-
Whitney test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
 
Figure 1 is a scatter-plot of logged punitive and compensatory damages with jury 
and judge trials from our data.122 In this figure, logarithmic scales are employed, 
since linear scales and untransformed data often fail to clarify the relations between 
the variables. Using logged data is a proper and valid method123 when dealing with 
damages, inter alia, punitive awards, because they are quite rarely normally 
distributed and could hardly assume standard regression. The best fitting regression 
lines for jury and judge trials also appear there. Intuitively, we can find that these 










                                                          
 121  Id.; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 122  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Fig.1. 
 123  For validity of using logarithmic scales, see generally ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER 
HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 59-65 
(2007).  
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Figure 1: Punitive to Compensatory Awards (logs) by Adjudicator
Figure 1: Punitive to compensatory Awards (logs) by Adjudicator 
 
Note: Lines are the best-fitting linear regression lines for jury and judge trials. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database. 
 
    Table 3 shows the ratios of logged transformed punitive to compensatory 
damages awards. As the third and fifth columns indicate, there is no significant 
difference between a jury or judge as adjudicators in both median and mean.124 To 
put it another way, juries and judges perform almost the same when assessing 
damages. Furthermore, these findings are generally in harmony with prior studies.125  
 

















Judge 1.0268 1.1133 49 
Note: The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-Whitney test; 
the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test. 
Data Source: Lexis Nexis 
D. Case Category, Case Types, Party Status, and Locale 
This Section mainly explores the ratios of logged punitive to compensatory 
damages by case category, party status, and locale. Table 4 summarizes the number 
and percentage of jury and judge trial characteristics, and the second and third 
columns show the number of jury and judge-only trials, respectively.  
                                                          
 124  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.3. 
 125  See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study, supra note 22; Eisenberg, Variability in 
Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 13; see also Hersch & Viscusi, Perform, supra note 24, 
at 36 (highlighting the judge-jury difference in assessing the punitive awards). 
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  As the rows of “Case Category” and “Case Types” in Table 4 illustrate, nearly 
one-half (49.1%) of the punitive damages cases involve civil rights, such as 42 U.S. 
§ 1983 (torts by federal or state government officials),126 42 U.S. § 1981 
(employment discrimination or dispute),127 and Americans Disabilities Act (ADA).128 
This trend is strikingly different from state courts.129 Juries see a disproportionate 
number of civil rights cases;  of the 156 civil rights cases, 146 (93.6%) were jury 
trials.130  
As for the row of “Case Types,” we categorize each case to only one type though 
disputes could involve more than one claim, and there could be an overlap across the 
claim types. Notably, the combined number of § 1981 and § 1983 litigations alone 
account for as much as 39.4%.131 Also notable is that jury trials dominate those 
punitive damages cases (92.0%).132 The second largest portion belongs to business 
torts cases, which include insurance, malpractice, copyright infringement, product 
liability, and so forth.133  
 As the “Party Status” column indicates, we categorize all of the punitive 
damages cases into four groups. For those cases that involve multiple plaintiff or 
defendant types, cases are categorized based on the importance of each litigant. In 
more than one-half of the cases (64.2%), the plaintiff was an individual, and the 
defendant was a non-individual, such as a corporation, hospital, or government.134 
Furthermore, most of the cases were decided by a jury. The results illustrate the 
popular and typical lore that individual victims can bring lawsuits against big 
companies with deep pockets and be awarded huge punitive damages through jury 
verdicts.  
 The distribution of jury-judge punitive damages awards cases, by locale, varies 
considerably. Almost all punitive damages cases were tried by juries in one region 
(Fourth Circuit),135 while judge-only trials accounted for 25.6% in another region 







                                                          
 126  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.4. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 333 Tbl.2.  
 130  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110, at Tbl.4. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
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Table 4: Summary of Jury and Judge Trial Characteristics in Punitive Damages 
Cases 
 Jury Judge 
Percent of Total 
Cases 
Case Category 
Civil Rights 146 10 49.1 
Business Torts 90 22 35.2 
Others 28 22 15.7 
Case Types 




55 4 18.6 
Insurance 20 2 6.9 
Financial Dispute 12 5 5.3 
Copyrights 3 1 1.3 
Product Liability 6 1 2.2 
Defamation and 
Privacy 
6 3 2.8 
Other Torts 72 12 26.4 
Contract 20 8 8.8 
Bankruptcy 0 8 2.5 



















48 13 19.2 
Locale 
Circuit of District of 
Columbia 
2 1 0.9 
1st Circuit 20 2 6.9 
2nd Circuit 15 4 6.0 
3rd Circuit 26 2 8.8 
4th Circuit 18 1 6.0 
5th Circuit 21 7 8.8 
6th Circuit 31 8 12.3 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/7
2017] PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVISITED 397 
 
7th Circuit 21 5 8.2 
8th Circuit 29 7 11.3 
9th Circuit 32 11 13.5 
10th Circuit 29 3 10.1 
11th Circuit 20 3 7.2 
N 264 54  
Note: Total Cases, N = 318. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database. 
1. Case Category 
Figure 2 explores the relationship between compensatory and punitive awards by 
case category. It illustrates a general pattern of awarding punitive damages: the 
business torts regression line is steeper than the civil rights line, indicating that juries 
or judges tend to award greater punitive damages in business disputes than in civil 
rights cases.  
 
 
Figure 2: Punitive to Compensatory Awards (logs) by Case Category 
 
2. Litigant Type 
Although party status was categorized into four groups in Table 4, we focus 
solely on cases involving two types of defendants (individual and non-individual) 
here to facilitate comparisons. The exploration will also provide us with insight into 
the relationship between the defendant’s wealth and the amount of punitive damages 
awarded.  
 As displayed in Table 5, almost all differences between individual and non-
individual defendants are not statistically significant. There is, however, one 
exception (median of punitive award), suggesting that non-individual defendants 
such as wealthy companies have to pay large amounts of punitive damages. It is also 
noteworthy that the average of compensatory awards for individual parties is larger 


























19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
398 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:379 
 
individuals is smaller than that for non-individuals, though the difference is not 
significant in either case.  
 












































2.13 10,033.57 265 
Note:  ***p<0.005. The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-
Whitney test; the significnce mean difference is based upon a t-test. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
E. The Supreme Court Decisions and Circuit Court Judges 
A concern in using data spanning eight years is whether the circuit court judges 
have hewed to or stayed current with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such as 
Philip Morris or Exxon, when it comes to dealing with the punitive awards cases 
before them. It seems self-evident that lower courts follow what the U.S. Supreme 
Court holds because case law, based upon the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than 
statutory law, dominates or rules in the Anglo-American legal system.137  
However, according to the results of this study, it is not the case that stare decisis 
dominates where the punitive damages regime is concerned. This Section attempts to 
show that the impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal circuit courts is 
mixed at best.  
1. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Year 
Table 6 represents the result of medians of punitive to compensatory ratios and 
punitive and compensatory awards by year. As a whole, the ratio seems stable. 
Taking a close look at the changes of ratios by year, however, it is true that the ratio 
dropped in 2009, 2010, and 2011, shortly after Exxon.138 What is beyond 
comprehension is that, as illuminated in Figure 3, there was a sudden increase in the 
ratio in 2012.139  It is also not clear why the median ratio in 2008 is as high as 3.33, 
which exceeds all the other years.140 All trends considered, the ups and downs seem 
                                                          
 137  Id. at Tbl.5. 
 138  Id. at Tbl.6. 
 139  Id. at Fig.3. 
 140  Id. at Tbl.7. 
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inexplicable and unrelated to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as the reasoning in 
Philip Morris and Exxon cannot explain the ratio trend completely. In other words, if 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s intention to curb the level of damages awarded had 
functioned, the ratio should have decreased.  
Despite the foregoing, we cannot totally exclude the possibility that the two 
decisions might have restrained punitive damages awards. An analysis of the ratio 
change alone does not provide insight into the impact of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions on the federal circuit court punitive damages regime.  
 
Table 6: Punitive to Compensatory Ratio By Year 













75,00 2877,736 255,000 291,000 106,000 304,000 282,853 486,932 350,000 
Number of 
Cases 
7 52 43 47 41 40 34 25 29 
Note: Year of 2004 ranges from November 1 to December 13, Year of 2012 
ranges from Janurary 1 to October 31, and the rest range from Janurary 1 to 
December 31 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
 
Figure 3:Median Punitive to Compensatory Ratio 
 
2. Punitive Damages over Time: Ratio by Period 
In that regard, we undertake two kinds of data analysis, dividing the eight-year 










2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 3: Median Punitive to Compensatory Ratio
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Table 7 shows the data of the impact of Philip Morris on federal circuit courts. 
The untransformed median has slightly risen (from 2.00 to 2.32),141 which seems to 
be contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s intention. Statistically speaking, its attempt 
to restrict the ratio may not have been fully accomplished. Yet, as the third column 
indicates, the change of median is insignificant. The slight rises of logged median 
and mean are also insignificant.  
 





































2.32 196 1.0639 1.1284 1.1284 192 
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 
2012. “Logged” stands for log (10). When calculating logged median and mean, 
six cases have been excluded, where logged compensatory damages are zero 
(ratio incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-
Whitney test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
 
Likewise, Table 8 shows the influence of Exxon on lower courts. As opposed to 
Philip Morris, the median (untransformed) dropped from 2.30 to 2.00 after Exxon,142 
which seems to indicate a change for the better as the U.S. Supreme Court has hoped 
for years. The slight decline, however, is not statistically significant. Although the 
logged means do marginally differ, logged medians do not show a significant 
difference (p=0.5150<0.10).143  
To put it briefly, what Tables 7 and 8 suggest is quite simple and obvious: neither 
Philip Morris nor Exxon changed the attitudes of lower federal circuit courts toward 
the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. These results are precisely the 








                                                          
 141  Id. at Tbl.8. 
 142  Id. at Tbl.8. n.1. 
 143  Id. 
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2.00 140 1.0525 1.0625 136 
Note: The data covers the time period November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012. 
“Logged” stands for log (10.) When calculating logged median and mean, six cases 
have been excluded, where logged compensatory damages are zero (ratio 
incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-Whitney 
test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test. ****Difference pre/post 
Exxon is significant at p<0.10. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database. 
3. Reduced Damages (Remittitur) 
Trial judges are entitled to reduce the amount of damages, including punitive 
damages, within their discretion if they believe that granted awards are improper. 
This power is called “remittitur.”144 When a defendant agrees to a proposed amount, 
a judge can enter the judgment. In practice, district judges frequently use this 
procedure when awarding punitive damages.145 This Section explores the impact of 
the Exxon decision on damage reductions. Here, we will examine whether judges 
have demonstrated a tendency to reduce the amount of awards more after Exxon, as 
opposed to before the decision.  
Out of 318 cases, we found sixty-seven cases in which punitive damages awards 
were reduced.146 In most cases, trial judges reduced punitive damages awards 
granted by juries (remittitur) in prior proceedings. However, there were also two 
cases in which punitive damages awards resulting from judge-only trials were 
reduced. The fact that only 21.07% (67/318) of the cases resulted in an award 
                                                          
 144  See generally LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 443-51 (6th ed. 2010). On the 
contrary, trial judges are also entitled to raise the damages if they believe an amount of 
damages is too small. This procedure is called additur. See David Baldus et al., Improving 
Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative 
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1119 (1995). None of the trials in this study involve additur. 
 145  As one court correctly stated, “Remittitur plays an important role in judicial economy 
by encouraging an end to litigation rather than a new trial.” Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 
715 N.E.2d 546, 556 (Ohio 1999). 
 146  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110. 
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reduction might suggest that trial or circuit court judges tend to show deference to 
the conclusions of fact finders like juries and trial court judges.  
 Table 9 indicates the result of punitive award reductions. In this section, the 
increasing rate stands for the rate of the latter to the former value minus one. For 
example, if the amount of the pre-Exxon punitive award was 500,000, and the post-
Exxon award 120,000, the increasing rate equals 1-120,000/500,000—namely, -
76.00% (decreasing rate: 76%).147  
With regard to medians and means of the decreasing rate, the period after the 
Exxon decision shows a drop (17.34% and 14.84%, respectively). Each indicator 
strikingly demonstrates a statistically significant difference. The result evidently 
suggests that after the Exxon decision, lower court judges tend to limit punitive 
damages awards much more than before the case was decided. Although it is not 
apparent that Exxon is the only dominant reason for the decrease in the level of 
punitive awards, it is true that both the median and mean indicate a drop after 2008.  
The drop in numbers after 2008 also suggests a difference in terms of the 
decision’s influence on juries and judges. It is quite natural and understandable that 
trial and circuit court judges, as experienced repeat-players, are more or less aware 
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and have an intrinsic incentive to adhere to legal 
doctrines; on the other hand, less experienced lay juries, as one-time players, do not 
have to be well-informed of jurisprudence. The result of this study comports with the 
Eisenberg’s finding that “in general, court decisions—including many (but not all) 
Supreme Court decisions—tend to be absorbed and propagated by judges more 
directly than by lay jurors.”148  
 

























82.87 -69.00 37 
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012. 
*****p<0.05. The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-Whitney 
test; the significance mean difference is based upon a t-test. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
 
 Returning to the subject of ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, a 
statistically significant change has not been observed. As stated above, the ratio is 
the one that the Court believes to be a pivotal criterion or a guiding principle to 
decide whether the amount of punitive damages awarded is constitutional. That is the 
reason why we ought to examine it here.  
 In this section, the increasing rate means the rate of the latter to the former ratio 
minus one. As an illustration, if the ratio of pre-Exxon punitive to compensatory 
                                                          
 147  See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 363 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 148  Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 348. 
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awards is 13.29 and post-Exxon it is 3.57, the increasing rate equals 1-3.57/13.29—
namely, -73.12% (decreasing rate: 73.12%).149  
 As shown in Table 10, the median of the increasing rate of ratio seems to have 
dropped by as much as 17.09%. However, using a Mann-Whitney test, the difference 
is not statistically significant (p=0.2083), which implies that the Exxon decision did 
not radically affect the decreasing rate of ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
for cases involving remittitur. 
According to these results, one may say that while Exxon has succeeded in 
curbing the level of punitive damages to the point where a statistically significant 
difference has been seen, the ratio is still not within a reasonable range as far as the 
federal circuit courts are concerned.  
In that regard, employing the ratio as a pivotal guiding principle of 
constitutionality of the punitive awards might be questionable. We will discuss this 
concept further below.  
 
Table 10: Increasing Rate of Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Awards, pre/post 
Exxon (2008) for Cases with Reduction 








Post-Exxon -75.82 36 
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 
2012. Three cases have been excluded where compensatory damages are zerio 
(ratio incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-
Whitney test. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
F. Stratifying the Punitive to Compensatory Ratio 
As pointed out in Section II.E, one of the factors that led the U.S. Supreme Court 
astray is having grouped the cases with low and high compensatory damages 
together. That is what Eisenberg and his coauthors correctly clarified by stratifying 
the level of compensatory awards in the data sets that the Court relied on in Exxon.150 
In this Section, we explore, using our gathered data, whether or not high 
compensatory damage cases are different from low ones in the same way as 
Eisenberg did.  
 Table 11 shows the result of median, mean, and standard deviation of punitive to 
compensatory damages ratio, across compensatory award ranges divided into seven 
layers. It is striking that all three indicators (i.e., median, mean, and standard 
deviation) decrease as compensatory damages increase. Notably, as for the cases 
with compensatory awards equal to or more than $100,000, the median is quite 
stable at below 2.00. Likewise, the mean or the standard deviation dramatically falls 
off, with an exception for the penultimate numerical row of the Table. That is solely 
because the range includes just one case whose ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages is extremely high at as much as 11,417.32.151 The numbers in parentheses 
                                                          
 149  In re Rountree, 478 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 150  Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 17-20. 
 151  Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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are those calculated with the exclusion of the outlier. One can see a pattern of 
decline clearly within these numbers.  
The penultimate column in the Table indicates the number of cases with ratios 
equal to or greater than 10, showing that only 63 out of 303 cases resulting in a 
punitive damages award have ratios exceeding a single digit—which the Court 
suggests will hardly, “to a significant degree[,] . . . satisfy due process” in the State 
Farm decision.152 The column also indicates that the rate of cases with ratios over 10 
drops dramatically at the very high levels of compensatory awards granted.  
 


























$k to 999 5,000.00 203,356.89 545,213.79 11 13 
$1k to $9,999 30.21 95.77 222.16 10 14 
$10k to 
$99,999 
3.49 8.55 18.78 19 74 
$100k to 
$999,999 
1.63 12.59 40.16 12 117 
$1m to 
$9,999,999 
1.51 4.89 12.98 9 66 
$10 m to 
$99,999,999 








1.00 1.00 0.00 0 2 
Note: k = 1000; m = 1,000,000. The data covers the period from November 1, 
2004 to October 31, 2012. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
 
  From a statistical viewpoint, one can examine the difference of median, mean, 
and standard deviation across large and small compensatory awards. As Table 12 
illustrates, the null hypotheses that median and standard deviation for cases with 
compensatory awards less than $10,000 are the same as those for cases with 
compensatory awards of $10,000 and more have been rejected. In other words, a 
statistically significant difference within two groups is observed with regard to both 
the median and standard deviation of ratio (p<0.001), although the mean does not 
achieve a statistical significance for some reason or another (p=0.19).  
So far, we have seen that the patterns of ratios are so different across ranges that 
we need to pay close attention to the level of compensatory awards when discussing 
the constitutionality of the punitive awards. The risk of an underlying inconsistency 
attends the Court’s holding in Exxon, as can be seen in the following quotation: 
                                                          
 152  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
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“[M]aking policy or doctrine based on grouping high and low compensatory cases 
together is questionable.”153 
 
Table 12: Test of the Hypotheses that Median, Mean, and Standard Deviation for 
Cases with Compensatory Awards Less than $10,000 Equal those for Cases with 
























$1 to 9,999 81.30 97,962.24 384,587.28 21 27 
$10,000 or 
greater 
1.23 50.33 687.30 42 276 
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2012. 
**Difference between low and high compensatory awards is significant at p<0.001. 
G. Federal Circuit Court and Punitive Damages 
In this Section, we focus on federal circuit court judges’ decisions regarding 
punitive damages awards. When reviewing the facts of the case and deciding to 
affirm or deny (vacate, reverse, and/or remand) the punitive damages awarded by a 
jury or trial judge, what factors or elements do circuit court judges take into 
consideration? Answering this question could clarify the relation between the U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions and those of federal circuit courts.  
From the perspectives of the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrines, such as Gore’s 
three-pronged guideline, the single digit rule in State Farm, or the one-to-one rule in 
Exxon, it seems more likely that the punitive to compensatory ratio, rather than 
amounts of punitive awards, dominates the reasoning in federal circuit court 
decisions. Examining this issue is not only rewarding and worthwhile, but also 
feasible and practical when it comes to adopting a statistical evaluative approach. 
1. Federal Circuit Court Judges’ Decisions to Affirm or Deny Awarded Punitive 
Damages 
Table 13 shows the results of median punitive damages awarded and ratio by 
decision. Broadly speaking, federal circuit court judges tend to negate, rather than 
declare valid, more punitive damages awards. Furthermore, as one would naturally 
predict, the difference between affirmation and denial is highly statistically 
significant in all medians. It is noteworthy that the most pronounced finding in this 
Table is the gap of median ratio across decisions. Therefore, it seems plausible that 
circuit court judges are more likely to negate the punitive damages award in cases 
where the ratio exceeds three, as opposed to when it falls below three.  
However, we cannot conclude that the ratio is the only influential element of the 
equation that judges consider when reviewing the constitutionality of the award. 
There is, thus, a need for an additional analytical approach in order to examine a 
                                                          
 153  Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 20. 
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cause-and-effect relationship between a court’s decision and factors, such as ratio, 
amount of the punitive damages award, case category, and so on.  
 
















Affirmation 268,000 5.4279 200 1.82 189 
Denial 1,006,333****** 6.0027****** 118 3.06****** 114 
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 
2012. Fifteen cases have been excluded where compensatory damages are zero 
(ratio incalculable.) The significance median difference is based upon a Mann-
Whitney test. ******decision difference is significant at p<0.01.  
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
2. Logistic Regression Models of Whether or Not Awarded Punitive Damages Were 
Affirmed 
Although we are not privy to the process behind all high courts’ holdings, 
logistic regression models enable us to know judges’ overall tendencies when 
determining the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.   
Because the dependent variable in a model of the decision to affirm the awarded 
punitive damages is dichotomous, we have employed logistic regression models, 
which are commonly used when analyzing the risk factors in various research fields, 
including epidemiological surveys. In this study, using logistic regression models 
helps us understand the degree and significance of each factor’s effects on the 
outcome.154  
Table 14 reports the results of logistic regression analyses that explore the effects 
of logged punitive damages awards (log 10), logged ratio of punitive to 
compensatory awards (log natural), dummied jury trial, party status, and case 
category. We added elements such as a jury’s participation to examine higher court 
judges’ prejudice against fact-finders, a party’s status to explore the relationship 
between defendant’s wealth and the decision, and case category to test the link 
between wrongdoers’ reprehensibility and the outcome.   
In both Models 1 & 2, the coefficient on the punitive damages award variable is 
considerably large and highly statistically significant. Moreover, the values on each 
coefficient are all negative, meaning that the more punitive damages awarded, the 
less likely a higher court is to affirm the amount awarded.  
 Other factors, including ratio, show no significance, despite our predictions to the 
contrary. Elements other than the size of the punitive damages award (log 10) have 
little or no impact on decisions.   
To summarize, it is neither ratio nor case category but the amount of punitive 
damages in its own right that determines the constitutionality of the award. That is, 
the sum of the punitive damages awarded has the most powerful impact on the high 
courts’ decisions to affirm or negate the award. It is noteworthy that ratio, one of the 
                                                          
 154  For an understanding of logistic regression, see generally DAVID W. HOSMER & 
STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2d ed. 2000). 
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most reliable and promising guideposts rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, is not a 
statistically significant factor, suggesting that circuit court judges do not rely on the 
ratio when deciding whether the punitive damages violate the due process of law.155 
Therefore, we can safely say that U.S. Supreme Court holdings do not function as 
the key criteria. Instead, circuit court judges do not follow the Court’s rationale 
regarding the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.  
 
Table 14: Logistic Regression Models of Whether Awarded Punitive Damages 
Were Affirmed by the Appellate Courts 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Dependent Variable = Punitive Damages Affirmed 
Punitive Award (log 10) -0.3829******* 0.4809******* 




Jury Trial Dummy -0.4849 -0.2790 







Case Category   
Civil Rights 0.5940 ------- 
Business Torts 0.2406 ------- 
Constant 2.9631 ******* 3.6362******* 
N 303 303 
Note: The data covers the time period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 
2012. Fifteen cases out of 318 have been excluded where the plaintiff won a zero 
compensatory award (ratio incalculable.) *******p<0.01. 
Data Source: Lexis-Nexis Database 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Key Findings 
Our current study attempted to examine the impact of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions concerning punitive damages on lower courts using 318 federal circuit 
court decisions.156 We obtained the following five main results.   
One key finding is that, as is shown in prior studies, there is no difference 
between decisions made by juries or judges when assessing damages. Conventional 
wisdom used to be that juries are so passionate about outrageous conduct by 
defendants that they frequently tend to award huge punitive damages against large 
companies; therefore, the jury system is the main culprit of the current tort law crisis. 
This study confirms the opposite in the way of federal circuit court cases. That is, 
juries award damages in the same way as judges sitting alone.   
A second important finding is the surprising stability of the ratio before and after 
Philip Morris and Exxon.157 Contrary to our prediction, this exploration established 
                                                          
 155  See infra Tbl.14. 
 156  Momioka, Data Set, supra note 110. 
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that those two decisions have not changed the proportionality between punitive to 
compensatory awards.158 Given that in most cases the fact-finder is a jury, there is an 
implication that the juries remain unaffected by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, at 
least with respect to punitive damages.159   
A third finding of great interest is about decreasing rates after remittitur of 
awards granted by trial court judges. A statistical analysis of sixty-seven cases with 
such a reduction showed that Exxon has succeeded in curving the level of punitive 
damages awarded but that it has not managed to control the ratio. However, given 
the fact that remittitur is within a judge’s discretion, these findings do not exclude 
the possibility that judges might have accepted or shared the Court’s concerns over 
“skyrocketing” punitive awards. 
A fourth key finding derives from stratifying the compensatory damages. The 
result is that the ratio becomes low and stable when the amount of compensatory 
awards is large. That result warns that it is risky and misleading to analyze damages 
awards together, primarily because the ratios significantly differ in both variance and 
median.   
A fifth main finding was acquired by employing logistic regression models. One 
can find that proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards is not the 
key factor that influences federal circuit court judges when deciding the 
constitutionality of a punitive damages award. Judges consider the amount of 
punitive damages awarded in their own right rather than employing or utilizing 
ratios.  
B. Implications of This Study 
The above findings require us to consider the meaning and function of a “ratio” 
again when dealing with punitive damages awards. We discuss here whether it is 
appropriate for the Court to employ ratio analysis of punitive to compensatory 
damages as a crucial factor in appellate court review regarding the constitutionality 
of such awards. From an empirical or statistical perspective, is the ratio still a useful 
and effective factor? If not, is there a promising alternative?  
To answer these questions, it is very helpful for us to rely upon stratification of 
damage awards. As shown in Section III.F and Table 11, the ratio and its variation 
differences between small and large compensatory damages zones are so significant 
that using a ratio calculated by taking into account the whole data is completely 
misleading. That is the very point where the analysis breaks down.   
                                                                                                                                         
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. 
 159  For the link between the Supreme Court decisions and social changes in general, see 
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2d ed. 2008). Rosenberg argues that even the 
Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, often cited as a milestone of the Civil 
Rights Movement, had quite a limited impact on American society. Id. at 156 (“While it must 
be the case that Court action influenced some people, I have found no evidence that this 
influence was widespread or of much importance to the battle for civil rights”); see also 
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the 
Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 34 (2001) (“[T]he public knows little about the Court and 
its workings.”). For a more general discussion of law and social change, see Scott L. 
Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change: What is the Field? What are the 
Questions?, 2013 WIS L. REV. 171, 173 (2013). 
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Thus, one possible solution to this problem is that the Court suggests handling 
punitive damages cases separately by dividing the compensatory awards into several 
parts and setting a ratio for each zone. This proposal, however, rests on the premise 
that utilizing a ratio is an effective approach.  
On the other hand, it is true that judges and juries utilize ratio analysis 
differently. As shown in Sections III.E.2-3, while no statistically significant change 
before and after Exxon has been observed in the ratios of punitive to compensatory 
damages awarded mainly by juries,160 the rate at which punitive damages were 
reduced by trial court judges showed a significant rise after Exxon.161 This difference 
ultimately derives from each adjudicator’s position and capacity—judges hate to 
have their decisions reversed or vacated by upper court judges and tend to hew to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings because of their professional and reputational 
interest. Jurors, however, do not have to obey the case law doctrine, such as the 
“one-to-one ratio rule” declared in Exxon or the “third party rule” in Philip Morris, 
unless they are told to do so by the presiding district court judge.162 In that regard, 
one could say that judge-jury difference in responding toward the Court’s holdings is 
all too clear in the results of this study.  
However, the relationship between adjudicator selection by litigants and the level 
of the ratios still needs further exploration. Literally, the jury is still out on this 
question.  
C. Limits of the Present Study 
Finally, it is of great importance to state what this article does not necessarily 
suggest, as well as some notable limitations.  
First, this study is intended to be exploratory with a limited sample of data from 
appellate court decisions compromised of only 318 punitive damages cases, which is 
not sufficient for data analysis. Furthermore, we cannot totally exclude the 
possibility that the gathered data is “selective” or distorted precisely because the 
source is a commercial database, LexisNexis. These weaknesses should be improved 
in the next research.  
Another limitation of this study, which should be addressed in the future, is the 
unexplained relationship between the amount of punitive damages awarded and the 
wealth of defendants. Although the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the 
importance of this issue, it has not made clear whether or not it is permissible for a 
fact-finder to take into consideration the wealth of a defendant when assessing 
punitive damages, and if so, to what extent. The Court will likely have to make a 
decision on this point in the near future.  
These issues, however, need to be discussed separately in future research.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It follows from what has been said thus far that the overall trend of the size of 
punitive damages awarded has been quite stable over time and not affected by U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions such as Philip Morris or Exxon.  
                                                          
 160  See supra Tbl.8  
 161  See supra Tbl.9  
 162  See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, Judge-Jury Difference, supra note 22, at 348 (discussing 
difference in judge-jury behavior in U.S. Supreme Court decisions). 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
410 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:379 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that disobedience of the federal circuit courts to 
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, with regard to punitive damages awards, does not 
necessarily suggest their dysfunction in American society. On the contrary, the 
significant stability in the level of punitive damages awarded and ratios of the last 
eight years may indicate that the punitive damages regime continuously serves the 
social justice purpose of letting the victims of big corporations achieve vindication 
through civil lawsuits. This is exactly the raison d’être punitive damages, which 
continues to intrigue foreign jurists like us in Japan, because it achieves law 
enforcement by private parties, not by bureaucratic order or legislation.  
In conclusion, this article contributes to growing literature suggesting the 
importance of employing statistical analyses in understanding myth and reality with 
regard to punitive damages awards.  
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